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2 3 : P o l i c i n g and s e cu r i t y
Benjamin Kelly
I n a city like Rome, whatever level of security of person andproperty existed must have been achieved through a variety ofmechanisms, many of them invisible and unconscious. In a mul-
titude of sophisticated ways, psychological inhibitions to the formation
of criminal designs would have been created and reinforced. Various
methods of surveillance and supervision are likely to have restrained
those who still formed such intentions. Earlier chapters of this volume
have discussed these subtle ways in which social control and public order
would have been maintained: relevant here are institutions such as the
family, slavery, patronage, collegia, as well as the authorities’ attempts to
guarantee basic needs such as food and water. But in most societies,
such mechanisms of control are never entirely successful. Casual refer-
ences suggest that Rome was no different, even though nothing precise
can be said about levels or patterns of ‘crime’ (either in the sense of
acts regarded as punishable by the law or of acts seen as serious wrongs
by society at large).1 In Rome, awareness of crime led to conscious
attempts to restrain criminality, and to apprehend and punish those
who committed crimes. This chapter discusses the question of how the
state, community and individual tried to cope with threats to person
and property at this conscious level.
The i d e a o f p u b l i c o rd e r
Earlier generations of scholars often approached this question with the
assumption that all civilized societies need professional, specialist police
forces, and sometimes manipulated the evidence to try to find one in
1 E.g. Martial, Liber spectaculorum 9(7); Pliny, Epistulae 3.14.6–8; Pliny, Historia Naturalis
19.59; Suetonius, Aug. 43, Tacitus, Ann. 4.22, 13.44, 14.42. On crime in Rome
generally, see Robinson 1992, 204–6; Me´nard 2001. On legal and lay definitions of
‘crime’, see Harries 2007, 1–11.
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Rome.2 There has quite rightly been a reaction against this approach,
with scholars stressing that such police forces were exceptionally rare
before the nineteenth century. It is a far from universal expectation
that the state should provide agents to carry out ‘policing’ – that is, to
do such things as patrolling the city to deter offenders and catch them
red-handed, hunting down criminals after the fact, and assisting the
courts with the detention, prosecution and punishment of offenders.3
It is conceivable that the manpower resources at the disposal of the
authorities in Rome were intended simply to deal with political threats.
However, in literary accounts of riots during the Principate there are
signs of an underlying assumption that state agents should repress riots
in Rome and elsewhere, whether political in origin or not. From the
period of the Principate, there is evidence of the idea that the imperial
authorities did or should take steps to ensure public order throughout
the empire.4 This is seen, for instance, in Epictetus’ statement that
‘Caesar appears to provide us with great peace, there are no longer any
wars, or battles, or large-scale banditry, or piracy, but at every hour
it is possible to travel the roads, or sail from the rising to the setting
sun’ (Arrianus, Epicteti Dissertationes 3.13.9–10). There is no reason to
think that the imperial authorities were expected to keep order in the
empire at large, but not in Rome itself. Indeed, Augustus acted on this
expectation by posting guards around the city during public spectacles
to prevent muggers from taking advantage of the deserted streets to prey
on the few people not attending the spectacle (Suetonius, Augustus 43).
Two centuries later, the jurist Ulpian stressed the urban prefect’s duties
in relation to public order in the city, writing that ‘it seems the peace
of the populace and good order of the games are responsibilities that
fall to the urban prefect; and he should even have soldiers on policing
duties (milites stationarii) dispersed around to guard the peace of the
populace and to report back to him what is being done and where’
(Digesta 1.12.1.12).
The expectations lying behind these statements are also reflected
in discussions in the ancient sources about what various types of official
should or did do in relation to petty criminality. Such statements are
good evidence for mentalities, even if not for what really happened.
2 E.g., Hirschfeld 1913, 576–91; Echols 1958; Freis 1967, 41, 44.
3 Nippel 1984, 20; 1988, 7–9; 1995, 2–3, 113–18; Sablayrolles 2001, 130.
4 Riots: Kelly 2007, 156–60. Order throughout the empire: Bre´laz 2005, 26–39. For
examples of the authorities acting on these expectations: Appian, Bell. Civ. 5.132;
Suetonius, Aug. 32; Tib. 37.
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The sources assume that, during the Republic and early Principate, the
aediles, amongst their many other duties, had the task of supervising
markets and baths, as well as having coercive powers which included the
exaction of fines. There was also a board of three minor magistrates, the
tresviri capitales, many of whose duties could be called police duties. They
oversaw the prison and the executions carried out there (Dig. 1.2.2.30).
Plautus also assumes that they rounded up escaped slaves during their
nightly patrols. The ancient sources take it for granted that the tresviri
exercised some form of criminal jurisdiction, or at least the power to
carry out preliminary inquiries. One text also states that the tresviri had
the task of investigating crimes, although just what this investigative
activity was meant to involve is quite unclear.5
The early years of the Principate saw the establishment of urban
and praetorian cohorts, as well as the vigiles, a paramilitary force that
conducted night patrols and extinguished fires. The prefects in charge of
these three new forces were vested with criminal jurisdictions at various
stages. The jurist Paulus states that the praefectus vigilum (‘prefect of the
vigiles’) can hand out minor corporal punishments to those negligent
in relation to fires, and that he has criminal jurisdiction over ‘arsonists,
burglars, thieves, robbers, and those who harbour them’, provided they
are not serious or notorious offenders, in which case the praetorian
prefect has jurisdiction (Dig. 1.15.3.1). An imperial rescript imposed on
the praefectus vigilum a positive duty to seek out escaped slaves and return
them to their owners (Dig. 1.15.4; cf. Paulus, Sententiae 1.6a.6). Various
inscriptions also suggest that the ranks of the vigiles (and also of the
urban cohorts) included officials with tasks connected with the arrest,
interrogation and incarceration of suspects.6 The jurisdictional compe-
tence of the praefectus vigilum and the penal infrastructure evidently put
at the disposal of the cohortes vigilum seem to be best explained by the
assumption that the vigiles were expected to apprehend various types of
criminals during their nocturnal patrols.
Something similar can be said of the urban cohorts. The juris-
tic sources assign the urban prefect a wide-ranging jurisdiction over
matters including theft, the fraudulent administration of trusts, forged
wills, sharp practice in markets, dishonesty on the part of bankers
5 Aediles: Plautus, Rud. 372–3; Seneca, De vita beata 7.3, Epist. 86.10; Tacitus, Ann.
13.28; Varro ap. A. Gellius,Noct. Att. 13.13.4; cf. Martial, Epigr. 5.84. Tresviri capitales:
Cascione 1999, esp. 85–117, 157–60 (on jurisdiction); Lintott 1999, 102 (on rounding
up escaped slaves); Varro, De lingua Latina 5.81 (on investigative functions).
6 Robinson 1992, 191–4; Sablayrolles 1996, 225–6, 232.
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and money changers, unlawful collegia, adultery, offences by freedmen
against masters and cruelty to slaves.7 By the early-third century, Ulpian
was able to write that the urban prefect had jurisdiction of ‘absolutely
all crimes’ (Dig. 1.12.1). In a discussion of Augustus’ establishment
of the urban prefecture as a permanent office, Tacitus claims that the
emperor was motivated by a desire to have an official ‘to keep the slaves
in order, and that part of the citizens that would be reckless and tur-
bulent unless it feared force’ (Tacitus, Annales 6.11). The urban prefect
can hardly have been expected to do all of these things in person: it
must have been assumed that he would use the impressive manpower
resources at his disposal to assist him. The wide-ranging statement
of Ulpian quoted above certainly takes it for granted that the pre-
fect would use his troops for surveillance and the repression of general
criminality.
‘ P o l i c i n g ’ a nd th e s t a t e
The idea that state agents should have a role in repressing minor crimi-
nality was certainly present, especially during the Principate, at least in
the minds of somemembers of the governing elite. This raises two ques-
tions: to what extent did these ideas result in effective action; and what
reaction did the state’s attempts at policing provoke amongst ordinary
people in Rome? These questions are to a certain extent interrelated:
effective policing relies to a large extent on community cooperation;
and the efficiency and honesty of a police force will in turn shape the
community’s perception of it. Answering these questions is made dif-
ficult by the fact that the sources contain virtually no cases showing
state agents policing mundane criminality. There are some reports of
soldiers keeping order at public spectacles and repressing riots, and a few
Christian martyr-acts depict the urban prefect and his cohorts persecut-
ing Christians.8 But there are no reports of actual cases in which they
dealt with more mundane crimes like burglary, theft or assault. Some
progress can be made, however, by considering the structural features
of the ‘policing’ institutions of the city.
The first relevant fact is that, during the Republic, and also during
the early fourth century, sheer lack of manpower must have hindered
7 Freis 1967, 45; Mantovani 1988; Robinson 1992, 190–1.
8 Spectacles: Cassius Dio 61.8.3; Tacitus, Ann. 13.24–5. Riots: Cassius Dio 73.13.4,
74.13.4; Herodian 1.12.6–9; [Seneca] Oct. 780–855; Historia Augusta, Didius Iulianus
4.6; Tacitus, Ann. 12.43, 14.45, 14.61. Christians: Freis 1967, 23–8 for references.
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the state’s attempts at policing. During the Republic, the lack of a
standing army and the taboo on exercising military command within
the pomerium meant that any ‘policing’ was left up to civilian officials
(Aulus Gellius 15.27.5). In the late Republic, there were only four
aediles and three tresviri capitales at any one time. Both the aediles and
the tresviri capitales were probably accompanied by a few burly atten-
dants (Plautus, Amphitruo 153–62; Varro ap. Aulus Gellius,Noctes Atticae
13.13.4), but a few dozen men cannot have had much of an impact on
regulating mundane criminality in the late republican city, with its pop-
ulation pushing into the hundreds of thousands. The establishment in
the early Principate of the vigiles and the praetorian and urban cohorts
represented an impressive increase in the manpower resources poten-
tially at the disposal of the state for policing duties. Precision is difficult,
but the numbers of men in these cohorts probably fluctuated between
around 10,000 in the first century to something over 20,000 in the
early third. There are signs, however, of a significant reduction in mili-
tary manpower in Rome under Diocletian. The praetorians were then
completely disbanded soon after the battle of the Mulvian Bridge in
ad 312, and the urban cohorts and vigiles also disappeared in the course
of the fourth century.9 We hear that when Flavius Leontius, urban pre-
fect in ad 355–6, quelled a riot, he used his attendants (apparitores) to
do so, presumably lacking the military manpower that his predecessors
had once enjoyed (Ammianus Marcellinus 15.7.2).
Second, none of these military or paramilitary bodies was in any
sense a specialist police force. During the Republic, the tresviri capitales
had another major claim on their time and energy: the organization of
fire prevention measures (Dig. 1.15.1). In the Principate, the vigiles took
over this task, and the demands of detecting and fighting fires must have
dramatically reduced the manpower available for their policing duties.
For their part, the praetorians were involved in ensuring the security of
the person of the emperor, even when he was outside the city. Members
of the praetorian cohorts were at times deployed outside the city on
other tasks as well. In Rome, they were also involved in the collection of
various taxes introduced by Caligula on litigation, foodstuffs and trades
such as prostitution. As for the urban cohorts, we know that in the
9 Inhibitions to military policing during the Republic: Nippel 1984, 20; Sablayrolles
2001, 129–30. The size of the military and paramilitary forces during the Principate:
Freis 1967, 36–42; Panciera 1993, 262; Coulston 2000, 81. Disappearance of these
forces in the fourth century: Durry 1938, 393–4; Freis 1967, 19–22; Sablayrolles 1996,
59–65.
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fourth century at least they had some role in the collection of customs
duties at the gates of the city.10
Then there is the question of how we should imagine the city
population’s interactions with these institutions. One relevant factor
here is surely the absence of serious mechanisms of accountability.
Suggestive is the situation in Rome in the second half of the sixteenth
century. In that period, there was a police force organized along military
lines, provided by the papal state. There were attempts to regulate police
conduct, but these were largely nugatory, to the point that the city
population loathed the police force, thanks to its heavy-handed, violent
and extortionate behaviour. The hostility of the population then served
to undermine effective policing further.11 In ancient Rome, there are
no signs of any police accountability mechanisms at all. Victims of
improper conduct by soldiers in Rome would have had little chance of
obtaining redress through the courts. Juvenal complains that grievances
against soldiers were heard in the military camp, with soldiers acting
as judge and jury, and it is plausible that court cases involving soldiers
really were heard in the camp by military judges. True, the praetorian
and urban cohorts were under military discipline, but the disciplinary
standards of the Roman army were hardly known for ensuring that
soldiers treated civilians with integrity. We hear, for instance, that after
the great fire of ad 64, soldiers of the praetorian and urban cohorts
and the vigiles took to looting the city rather than safeguarding law
and order. In second-century Carthage, the soldiers posted there on
policing duties seem to have run extortion rackets, demanding money
from pickpockets, bath-thieves, gamesters, and Christians in return
for protection from prosecution or other forms of harassment.12 One
suspects that, in the absence of safeguards, similar problems would have
been encountered in Rome.
The sources certainly contain signs of friction and alienation
between civilians and the various military and paramilitary bodies
10 Manpower limitations of the vigiles: Rainbird 1986, 151; Nippel 1995, 96–7. External
deployment of praetorians: Durry 1938, 274–80; Passerini 1939, 191–6. Praetorians
and tax collection: Suetonius Cal. 40; McGinn 1998, 256–64. Urban cohorts and
customs duties: Codex Theodosianus 4.13.3 = Codex Iustinianus 4.61.5; Freis 1967,
46.
11 Blastenbrei 2006.
12 Cases heard in military camps: Juvenal 16.7–34; Campbell 1984, 251–2, 431. Looting
in ad 64: Cassius Dio 62.17.1, cf. Tacitus, Ann. 15.38. Extortion by soldiers in
Carthage: Tertullian, De fuga in persecutione 13; McGinn 1998, 260–1.
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stationed in the city.13 On various occasions during the third cen-
tury, crowds are said to have attacked the praetorians, and vice versa.14
Epictetus also stated that soldiers in Rome would act as agents provoca-
teurs, tempting people to make disloyal statements about the emperor
and then arresting them (Arrianus, Epict. diss. 4.13.5), a practice that
cannot have inspired civilian confidence in the city’s military forces.
Studies of the epigraphic evidence have suggested a certain social dis-
tance between civilians and urban soldiers and vigiles. For soldiers sta-
tioned in Rome, rates of family formation were low, no doubt in
part thanks to the ban on the marriage of soldiers in the period from
Augustus to Septimius Severus. When urban soldiers did marry or
take concubines, these tended to be of fairly low social origin. And
there is scant sign of other forms of social contact: for instance, there
is a striking absence of dedications set up by soldiers and civilians in
cooperation.15
Commun i t y ‘ s e l f - p o l i c i n g ’ ?
Thus, factors such as a lack of manpower and proper specialization,
as well as a distant or downright hostile relationship with the city
community, are likely to have seriously retarded the effectiveness of
‘policing’ institutions in the city. The total lack of known cases of
state agents carrying out acts of policing in relation to petty crimes
is consistent with this conclusion. The question then arises of just
how social control and personal security were achieved. One sugges-
tion that has been urged very strongly is that the community essen-
tially policed itself. There is evidence for a range of rituals dating back
into Rome’s earliest history according to which individuals and groups
expressed disapproval using methods which ranged from defamatory
songs through to fully fledged lynchings. Some scholars, impressed
by the apparent similarity between these rituals and collective rituals
of disapproval in more recent European societies such as charivari and
13 Pace Sablayrolles 1997, there is no evidence that the vigiles were regarded as figures
of sympathy who were part of the conviviality of Roman street life. Neither their
portrayal as inept buffoons nor their nickname proves anything (Petronius, Sat.
78; Tertullian, Apologeticus pro Christianis 39). Buffoons need not be likeable, nor
nicknames affectionate.
14 Cassius Dio 80.2.3; Herodian 2.4.1, 7.11.6–12.7; Hist. Aug., Maximini 20.6.
15 Panciera 1993; Sablayrolles 1996, 396–406.
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Katzenmusik, have seen these as examples of the city community polic-
ing itself.16
The Law of the Twelve Tables (mid-fifth century bc) apparently
threatened capital punishment ‘if anyone should chant (occentavisset) or
write a song which brings infamy or ill repute (flagitium) to another’.
The verb occentare has been taken to be part of the language of pop-
ular justice, referring to rabble-rousing chanting before a wrongdoer’s
house. In reality, the word is so archaic that its meaning is impossible
to recover with clarity. The resonances of flagitium are clearer: there is
an etymological connection between flagitium (‘ill repute’), and flagrare
(‘to burn’) and flagellare (‘to flog’), suggesting that originally this ritual
included the flogging of the target or the burning of his or her house.
Closely related too was flagitatio, the practice of demanding property
with shouts. This could be done before a house or in some other pub-
lic place, like the forum. Two other practices are also usually grouped
under the rubric of ‘popular justice’. One is squalor, the act of going
around in public with shabby clothing and dishevelled hair as a way
of casting odium on someone who had committed a supposed wrong.
The second was the practice of people who were in the process of
being robbed or attacked calling on the assistance of neighbours and
passers-by. In this connection, the sources usually mention the formula
implorare Quiritum fidem (‘to call upon the good faith of the citizens’)
or similar. The sources for the Principate mention a variant on this,
depicting people calling on the good faith (fides) of the emperor, either
in person, or in the form of his image or statue.17
These rituals of popular justice are most vividly attested in Plautus.
In the Mostellaria, the money-lender Misargyrides, who has lent money
to the prodigal Athenian youth Philolaches, approaches the youth’s
slave in public. The money lender engages in flagitatio, demanding the
payment of interest owed (Plautus, Mostellaria 603–5). Another relevant
scene occurs in the Rudens, when two freeborn women, who had been
captured by pirates and sold to a pimp, seek refuge in a temple. The pimp
tries to drag them out, but a slave friendly to the women calls on the
fides of the people of Cyrene, and various men in the vicinity duly come
to their aid (Plautus, Rudens 615–26). But the problem with Plautus,
16 Veyne 1983, esp. 12–25; Nippel 1995, 39–46; Krause 2004, 61–2; Me´nard 2004, 10,
71, 118.
17 Occentare: XII Tab. 8.1; Usener 1913, 359–60; Rives 2002, 283–4. Flagitatio: Usener
1913, 360–73; Lintott 1999, 9–10. Squalor: Lintott 1999, 16–21. Fidem implorare:
Lintott 1999, 11–16.
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as ever, lies in knowing just how his fictional world, influenced by its
Greek models, correlated with the actual realities of the city of Rome
in his day. It is clear enough from the existence of a technical Latin
vocabulary of flagitatio, and also from the mention of these phenomena
in the Twelve Tables, that these were ancient Roman practices. Yet it
is far from clear that the representation of these institutions in Plautus
reflects what was happening on the streets of Rome in 200 bc. And
even if Plautus is describing what happened in the Rome of his day,
these scenes cannot be assumed to represent routine practices in the
cosmopolis of ad 200.
Indeed, when we look at the so-called rituals of popular justice in
the cold light of history, the case for community self-policing starts to
look weak. Even if we take at face value all the reports of concrete cases
of this sort of behaviour in the city of Rome, there are still not very
many. Moreover, most of these are essentially political protests. There
are very few non-political cases, only one of which could be called a
‘popular justice’ response to a homicide (Seneca, De clementia 1.15.1),
and none of which is a reaction to a mundane crime such as a theft
or assault.18 Nor can cases of political protest carried out according to
traditions of ‘popular justice’ be taken as evidence of contemporary
communal responses to mundane criminality. Such political protests
could well have been self-consciously archaizing, with acts of verbal
protest and political violence being implicitly legitimated by traditions
about methods of plebeian agitation and self-help in the early Republic.
But perhaps it is too much to demand concrete cases. Scholars
who have argued for the role of ‘popular justice’ in day-to-day social
regulation have also pointed to the various passages, mostly in works of
poetry or fiction, containing generalized references to supposed pop-
ular justice practices, or fictitious situations involving these rituals. In
Catullus 42, the poet calls upon his poems to encircle a certain woman
and demand back the tablets on which they are written, which she
has supposedly stolen – in other words, to engage in flagitatio. To take
18 Political protests: Appian, Bell. Civ. 1.32–3, 1.54; Ammianus Marcellinus 27.3.8;
Asconius 93 C; Cicero, De domo sua 14, Epistulae ad familiares 1.5b.1, De lege agraria
2.13, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem 2.3.2, 2.11.1; Cassius Dio 50.10.2, 55.27.1–3, frag.
95.3; Diodorus Siculus 36.16; Florus 2.4; Livy, Periochae 74; Plutarch, Pompey 48;
Suetonius, Caesar 80, 85, Aug. 55, Gaius 27, Nero 39, 45, Domitian 14; Tacitus, Ann.
1.72, 4.28–9, 6.39, 14.42–5, 15.49; Valerius Maximus 9.7.4. Non-political cases:
Cato ap. A. Gellius, Noct. Att. 17.6.1; A. Gellius, Noct. Att. 4.5; Pliny, Hist. Nat.
10.121–3; Seneca,Clem. 1.15.1; Statius, Silvae 1.2.26–30; Tacitus, Ann. 3.36; Valerius
Maximus 7.8.5.
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another example, in the Satyricon Encolpius claims that when set upon
and forced to perform unspeakable acts by Quartilla and her two lusty
maids, he attempted invocare Quiritum fidem (‘to appeal to the good faith
of the citizens’). But these could be taken as light-hearted allusions to
quaint practices that endured in cultural memory, even though they did
not often occur in the streets of Rome in the time of Catullus or Petro-
nius. It is also true that several classical jurists hold that ‘popular justice’
practices, including flagitatio and squalor, could give rise to an action for
personal insult (iniuria).19 Yet it is dangerous to assume a situation was
common simply on the basis that it was discussed by the jurists.
Even if we can convince ourselves on the basis of these vari-
ous types of evidence that the customs of ‘popular justice’ were still
widespread in the late Republic and Principate, it does not follow that
they contributed much to public order and social regulation. For one
thing, both the ‘real’ and the imaginary cases were not really instances in
which a clear collective consciousness was outraged. Rather, they were
attempts to negotiate ethical problems whose solution was unclear and
contested. Take, for instance, the case reported by Seneca, in which a
member of the equestrian order flogged his own son to death. Mem-
bers of the populus (including both fathers and sons) waylaid him in
the forum and stabbed him with styluses. Augustus barely managed
to rescue him by appearing in person (Seneca, Clem. 1.15.1). There
was, however, a belief that fathers had the legal right to kill their own
children. This belief was possibly a myth sustained by the rhetorical
strategies of authoritarian fathers trying to resist threats to their author-
ity from other family members. But if it was a myth, it was one in which
many Romans believed.20 The outraged crowd in the forum was thus
not enforcing a clearly defined norm, but rather taking a stance on a
morally and legally murky issue. The crowd’s sense of right and wrong
was not indicative of the collective morality of the community at large,
but merely of the moral feeling of the members of that particular crowd.
So we should not see rituals such as flagitatio, squalor and lynching as tools
for the enforcement of defined norms, but rather as tactics designed to
enforce a particular view in a disputed case. The same applies a fortiori
in political cases.
There is also a class dynamic visible in various concrete cases
such as the near lynching of the member of the equestrian order by
members of the populus, and also in Tacitus’ report that in ad 21 various
low-status people (including slaves and freedmen) had been shielding
19 Dig. 47.10.15.2–10, 27; Gaius, Institutiones 3.220. 20 Shaw 2001, 56–77.
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themselves behind portraits of the emperor to cast odium on people
of reputation.21 These tactics were also used to try to redress other
power imbalances, and negotiate a variety of social tensions, including
those between male and female, young and old, and patron and client.
For example, we hear of a second-century bc case in which a woman
lent money to her husband. When the marriage soured, she instructed
a slave to follow the man around demanding the money back (Cato
Maior ap. A. Gellius, Noctes Atticae 17.6.1). We can perhaps read this
case as one in which flagitatio was used as a tactic in a marital dispute,
and was prompted by the woman’s realization of the difficulties that
she would face suing her own husband. These were not, therefore,
occasions on which the whole community would spontaneously rally
together to stigmatize and punish a deviant. Rather, they were used by
a section of society, often to pursue sectional interests, or by individuals
to pursue individual interests.
Nor did these rituals necessarily function as methods of orderly
dispute resolution: indeed, they were sometimes themselves potentially
a threat to public order. An inscription from Cnidos shows Augustus
reproaching that city for failing to check amanwho had been coming by
night before a house and engaging in a sort of flagitatio: the emperor says
that this behaviour had threatened the safety of the whole community
(Sherk RDGE no. 67). In the emperor’s mind, therefore, there was a
close connection between nocturnal protests before someone’s house
and large-scale disorders. A legal compilation dating to around ad 300
also assumes that the singing of defamatory songs was a threat to public
order (disciplina publica) (Paulus, Sent. 5.4.15). And one suspects that this
fear was well founded: the goal of rituals such as flagitatio was to gather
bystanders and inflame their disapproval. It probably was not a large step
from that to a genuinely riotous situation. Particularly during the strife
of the late Republic, these ancient traditions were in fact appropriated
by organizers of mobs to legitimate political violence.22
The rituals of collective disapproval, should, therefore, be seen as
something more complex and dangerous than the mechanism by which
a community policed itself in the absence of an effective state police
force. In fact, they might have threatened public order more often than
they maintained it. The attested cases look more like tactics in disputes
that revealed structural tensions in society. Cases of straightforward
21 Tacitus, Ann. 3.36. See too [Quintilian] Declamationes minores 364; Seneca the Elder,
Contr. 10.1; Tacitus, Ann. 4.28–9.
22 Lintott 1999, 6–21.
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crimes like thefts, assaults and murders being treated in this way are rare
to non-existent. Community ‘self-policing’ is unlikely to have been
much of a factor in controlling mundane criminality.
S e l f - d e f e n c e
One is left with the problem of how people managed to achieve basic
security of person and property in a city without an effective police
force, and in which the rituals of collective action were as likely to
threaten public order as to preserve it. The answer might be that order
simply was not kept – that levels of crime and violence were far higher
than would be considered acceptable in most modern cities. Alterna-
tively, it could be that the more subtle mechanisms of social control
mentioned above were relatively successful at limiting crime, render-
ing explicit attempts by state and community to combat crime largely
otiose.We simply lack the statistical evidence needed to choose between
these scenarios. But casual references certainly suggest a belief that the
city was not crime-free, and for protection against such crime as did
exist, what must have really mattered were not the state’s efforts at
‘policing’, or the community’s willingness to ‘police’ itself, but indi-
viduals’ capacities to protect themselves. In this regard, classical Rome
would have been no different from most pre-modern European cities.
In sixteenth-century Rome, for instance, the rich travelled the streets
with armed retainers and people of all classes went around ‘armed to
their teeth’ with weapons including sticks, daggers, swords and wheel-
lock pistols.23 They felt the need to be so armed in spite of the fact that
for most people the carrying of weapons was illegal – so great was their
fear of the lawless streets.
In classical Rome, lawyers and legislators recognized the grim
reality that citizens had to defend themselves. Roman law permitted
the use of lethal force not only to protect one’s person from attack,
but also to protect one’s household from thieves (both daytime and
nocturnal).24 This need for self-protection is illuminated by the elder
Pliny’s statement that members of the plebs living in apartments had
been forced to give up their window box gardens and block up their
windows as a result of a terrible outbreak of violent burglary (Hist. Nat.
23 Individual’s role in self-protection in classical Rome: Nippel 1995, 97; Sablayrolles
2001, 130; Krause 2004, 46–7. Sixteenth-century Rome: Blastenbrei 2006, 86.
24 XII Tab. 8.12–13; Collatio 7.2.1, 7.3.2–3; Dig. 9.2.5 pr., 48.8.9; Macrobius, Saturnalia
1.4.19.
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19.59). Even if the belief in a crime wave was merely a moral panic,
the popular response is still interesting. The people did not clamour for
more police or form vigilante squads: they boarded up their windows
and hoped for the best.
The need to take private measures for one’s own security is attested
in a mass of incidental detail in the sources. Consider first the aristocratic
urban house. It is true that in the aristocratic house public and private
space were conflated, since clients and others were permitted entry to
some rooms (Vitruvius, De architectura 6.5.1–2). Yet it was entry very
much on the owner’s terms. Literary descriptions assume that houses
presented strong, closed doors to the street. A passage in Ovid suggests
that windows facing the street tended to be high and inaccessible (Ars
Amatoria 2.244–6), and the remains of houses in Ostia and Pompeii
tend to confirm this. The doors of the great house might be opened for
the morning salutatio, but several casual comments suggest that, at least
during the Principate, doormen would control entrance even during
this ritual (Martialis, Epigr. 5.22; Seneca, De constantia sapientis 14.1–2).
And texts from both the Republic and the Principate suggest that at
other times of the day and night doors were shut, and doormen firmly
in control of who came in. Seneca assumes that doormen would be
armed with large sticks to help repel unwanted visitors (Const. 14.2).
When the proprietor of an aristocratic house (or his or her fam-
ily) moved around the city, it would sometimes be in the presence of
a retinue. We hear of the great politicians of the late Republic moving
around with retinues of supporters and clients (e.g. Sempronius Asellio
ap. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 2.13.4). Even when political violence was
not at issue, there are signs that the rich sometimes moved around with
attendants. In his third satire, Juvenal imagines that a nocturnal bully
looking for a brawl will avoid the man who passes by in a scarlet cloak
with a long column of attendants carrying torches and lamps (3.282–5;
cf. Propertius 2.29a). The literary and epigraphic records also attest the
use of litter bearers (lecticarii), who by definition were strong men likely
to deter any street crime against their charges. Suggestive here is the epi-
taph of a certain Iucundus, a lecticarius for a member of the aristocratic
house of the Statilii Tauri, which boasts that ‘as long as he lived, he was a
man and defended himself and others’ (CIL 6.6308). In fourth-century
Rome, these practices continued: Ammianus complains both about
those who pass through the streets of the city ‘without fear of danger’,
accompanied by huge retinues of slaves, and about women who travel
the city in closed litters (Ammianus Marcellinus 14.6.16–17, 28.4.8).
The children of the great households would also be accompanied
422
Po l i c i n g and s e cu r i t y
by paidagogoi as they walked the streets. These attendants had mul-
tiple functions, but one was to keep their charges safe (e.g. Appian,
Bellum Civile 4.30).
It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that every time a
high-status person trod the streets, he or she was accompanied by a
bevy of bodyguards. But the evidence does suggest that people with
the necessary resources could employ a range of techniques to keep
themselves safe. Wealth and social status, in other words, would have
been the only true guarantors of security. The poor could give up their
window-box gardens and block their windows, but one needed to be
a slave owner or have access to other types of dependants to be truly
safe on the streets, especially at night. Finally, when attempts at self-
defence failed and one became a crime victim, self-help was relevant
in another sense. From the late Republic onward there were various
standing criminal courts available in which crimes against person and
property could be tried. In the absence of public prosecutors, it fell
to private individuals to bring prosecutions. Social position and wealth
were again very relevant here, since they afforded access to legal advice
and representation, the manpower physically to bring a criminal into
court,25 not to mention a chance of being taken seriously by judges
and jurymen who would be members of the elite. In this second sense,
therefore, social status was relevant to self-help against criminals.
Conc lu s i on s
Although some members of the Roman elite believed that the state
should have a role in ensuring security of person and property, it is
unlikely that the soldiers and officials entrusted with this task were ter-
ribly successful. Nor is there much evidence of genuine ‘self-policing’
by the urban community, especially during the Principate. Rather it
would have been for individuals to keep themselves and their prop-
erty safe as best they could. This conclusion is, of course, a matter of
emphasis. It would be rash to claim that the vigiles never managed to
round up a thief in the streets at night, or that angry neighbours never
lynched a murderer. Rather, what I suggest is that individuals’ security
was probably more the result of their own efforts than those of the state
or the community. And I particularly think that we should abandon
the cosy communitarian notion that rituals like flagitatio ensured the
25 Krause 2004, 64.
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enforcement of some collective consensus. When it came to security,
as with so many basic necessities of life, the city of Rome must have
been a profoundly differentiated and unequal society.
Fur th e r r e ad i ng
Any further reading should begin with Nippel 1984; 1995. These works
collect the relevant ancient evidence, and offer an analysis that takes
the study of Roman policing to a new level of sophistication. Also
fundamental for the Republic is Lintott 1999, 89-106, which analyses
policing institutions and provides an assessment of their role that is
perhaps somewhat less understated than that offered by Nippel 1984
and 1995. Lintott also discusses the archaic traditions of ‘popular justice’
and their role in legitimating the political violence of the late Republic
(1999, 6–21). Fuhrmann 2012 offers a thorough discussion of policing
institutions during the Principate, not only those in Rome but also
those in Italy and the provinces. Harries 2007 discusses the structure
of the criminal courts of the late Republic and Principate, and the
construction of ‘crime’ in lay and legal discourses.
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